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 Abstract 
Microsoft has made substantial enhancements to the kernel of the Microsoft 
Windows Vista operating system. Kernel improvements are significant 
because the kernel provides low-level operating system functions, including 
thread scheduling, interrupt and exception dispatching, multiprocessor 
synchronization, and a set of routines and basic objects. 
This paper describes some of the kernel security enhancements for 64-bit 
edition of Windows Vista. We also point out some weakness areas (flaws) that 
can be attacked by malicious leading to compromising the kernel. 
 Keywords 
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  Introduction 
 
The kernel is the lowest-level, most central part of a computer operating system and 
one of the first pieces of code to load when the machine starts up. The kernel is what enables 
the software of the machine to talk to the hardware and is responsible for basic operating 
systems housekeeping tasks such as memory management, launching programs and processes, 
and managing the data on the disk. The performance, reliability, and security of the entire 
computer depend on the integrity of the kernel [1]. 
 
http://ljs.academicdirect.org 
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Figure 1. Structure of kernel-based operating system [2] 
 
"Kernel patching" or "kernel hooking" is the practice of using unsupported 
mechanisms to modify or replace kernel code. Patching fundamentally violates the integrity of 
the Windows kernel and is undocumented, unsupported and has always been discouraged. 
The new kernel-mode security features in Windows Vista include among them: 
PatchGuard and Restricted user-mode access to \Device\Physical Memory. These changes 
may secure the kernel of Windows Vista 64-bit Edition significantly. 
 
    Scope of this paper 
The scope of this paper covers some of the new security features that have been 
incorporated to keep malicious code from compromising the kernel. Specifically, PatchGuard 
and Restricted user-mode access to \Device\Physical Memory. Since most of these features 
are only available in the 64-bit edition of Windows Vista, this paper will focus on the 64-bit 
edition. 
 
  Limitations  of  this  paper 
Only some attacks against PatchGuard will be discussed. This paper does not review 
the implementation of PatchGuard.  
 
 
Windows Vista Booting Process 
 
  Microsoft has completely reengineered the boot environment for Windows Vista to 
address the increasing complexity and diversity of modern hardware and firmware. A key 
100  
Leonardo Journal of Sciences 
ISSN 1583-0233 
  Issue 12, January-June 2008 
p. 99-110 
 
aspect of this reengineering is a new firmware-independent data store called boot 
configuration data (BCD). BCD is designed to handle boot environment data for any type of 
system. It provides access to the information and applications that Windows Vista and later 
versions of Windows use to load the operating system or run boot applications such as 
memory diagnostics. 
 
Some key Characteristics of boot configuration data (BCD) 
•  BCD provides clean and intuitive structured storage for boot settings. 
•  BCD abstracts the underlying data store, making BCD independent of the underlying 
firmware or processor architecture.  
•  BCD is available at run time as well as during the boot process. 
•  BCD provides improved security over boot.ini. 
•  BCD is designed to handle systems with multiple versions and configurations of 
Windows, including versions earlier than Windows Vista.  
•  BCD is the only boot data store that is required for Windows Vista and later versions of 
Windows [3]. 
 
    Windows Vista Boot Manager 
The process begins with Vista Boot Manager, located in the %SystemDrive%\bootmgr 
file (for PC/AT legacy BIOS) or %SystemDrive%\Boot\EFI\bootmgr.efi (for EFI BIOS). 
Though it can also be used to boot legacy versions of Windows, the Vista Boot Manager is 
required to boot Windows Vista. 
The Vista Boot Manager calls InitializeLibrary, which in turn calls BlpArchInitialize 
(GDT, IDT, etc.), BlMmInitialize (memory management), BlpFwInitialize (firmware), 
BlpTpmInitialize (TPM), BlpIoInitialize (file systems), BlpPltInitialize (PCI configuration), 
BlBdInitialize (debugging), BlDisplayInitialize, BlpResourceInitialize (finds its own .rsrc 
section), and BlNetInitialize. 
A typical BCD entry for the Boot Manager looks like this: 
Windows Boot Manager 
Identifier {bootmgr} 
Type 10100002 
Device partition=C: 
Description  Windows Boot Manager 
Locale En-US 
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Inherit options  {globalsettings} 
Boot debugger  No 
Pre-boot EMS Enabled  No 
Default {current} 
Resume application  {3ced334e-a0a5-11da-8c2b-
cbb6baaeea6d} 
Display order  {current} 
Timeout 30   
Finally, the Boot Manager calls BlImgStartBootApplication to transfer control to the 
Windows Vista OS Loader [4]. 
 
    Windows Vista OS Loader 
The bootmgr calls the Windows Vista OS Loader, which is located under 
%SystemRoot%\System32\WINLOAD.EXE. WINLOAD.EXE replaces NTLDR (the legacy 
Windows NT OS loader). For the remainder of this section, “it” refers to the instructions in 
WINLOAD.EXE beginning at the entry point (OslMain). 
A typical BCD entry for the Windows Vista OS Loader looks like this: 
Windows Boot Loader 
Identifier {current} 
Type 10200003 
Device Partition=C: 
Path: \Windows\system32\WINLOAD.EXE 
Description Microsoft  Windows 
Locale en-US 
Inherit options  {bootloadersettings} 
Boot debugger  No 
Pre-boot EMS Enabled  No 
Advanced option  No 
Options edito  No 
Windows device  Partition=C: 
Windows root  \Windows 
Resume application  {3ced334e-a0a5-11da-8c2b-cbb6baaeea6d} 
No Execute policy  OptIn 
Detect HAL.  No 
No integrity checks  No 
Disable boot display  No 
Boot processor only  No 
Firmware PCI settings  No 
Log initialization  No 
OS boot information  No 
Kernel debugger  No 
HAL breakpoint  No 
EMS enabled in OS  No 
 
  Execution begins at OslMain. It uses a lot of the same code bootmgr, so the 
InitializeLibrary works the same way in WINLOAD.EXE. After InitializeLibrary, control is 
transferred to OslpMain. The osloader.xsl file controls the advanced (Vista-specific) boot 
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options during the OSbootup. After handling the advanced boot options (in 
OslDisplayAdvancedOptionsProcess), WINLOAD.EXE is now ready to prepare for booting. 
Booting begins by first opening the boot device (using BlDeviceOpen). BlDeviceOpen will 
use a different set of device functions depending on the device type. 
For example the function for block I/O (_BlockIoDeviceFunctionTable) these are: 
dd offset _BlockIoEnumerateDeviceClass@12 ; 
BlockIoEnumerateDeviceClass(x,x,x) 
dd offset _BlockIoOpen@8 ; BlockIoOpen(x, x) 
dd offset _BlockIoClose@4 ; BlockIoClose(x) 
dd offset _BlockIoReadUsingCache@16 ; BlockIoReadUsingCache(x,x,x,x) 
dd offset _BlockIoWrite@16 ; BlockIoWrite(x,x,x,x) 
dd offset _BlockIoGetInformation@8 ; BlockIoGetInformation(x,x) 
dd offset _BlockIoSetInformation@8 ; BlockIoSetInformation(x,x) 
dd offset ?handleInputChar@OsxmlMeter@@UAEHG@Z ; 
OsxmlMeter::handleInputChar(ushort) 
dd offset _BlockIoCreate@12 ; BlockIoCreate(x,x,x) 
Therefore, it is for console (_ConsoleDeviceFunctionTable), Full Volume Encryption 
(_FvebDeviceFunctionTable), serial port (_SerialPortFunctionTable) and PXE 
(_UdpFunctionTable). Some of the function callbacks are shared between different classes 
(e.g., serial port and PXE). After that, the LOADER_PARAMETER_BLOCK structure is 
initialized in OslInitializeLoaderBlock. The LOADER_PARAMETER_BLOCK contains 
information on the system state, such as boot device, ACPI and SMBios tables, etc. Next it 
discovers the system disks (OslEnumerateDisks) and loads the system hive   
KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (OslpLoadSystemHive). After the system hive is loaded, we 
encounter the first code integrity check point in the Windows Vista boot process 
(OslInitializeCodeIntegrity). First it calls MincrypL_SelfTest, which validates the SHA1 
hashing and PKCS1 signature verification algorithms are working (using a pre-defined test 
case). If the pre-defined test case fails, it returns error code 0xC0000428. Next, it checks if a 
debugger is enabled (BlBdDebuggerEnabled). If there is a debugger enabled, it calls 
KnownAnswerTest; otherwise, it skips the test and once all the integrity checks have passed 
(unless all integrity checks have been disabled), OslInitializeCodeIntegrity will return 
successfully, and execution continues in OslMain again. 
  The following boot drivers must also pass the code integrity checks even if a debugger 
is enabled (otherwise WINLOAD.EXE will refuse to boot Windows Vista): 
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\Windows\system32\bootvid.dll 
\Windows\system32\ci.dll 
\Windows\system32\clfs.sys 
\Windows\system32\hal.dll 
\Windows\system32\kdcom.dll (or kd1394.sys or kdusb.dll, depending on 
boot options) 
\Windows\system32\ntoskrnl.exe 
\Windows\system32\pshed.dll 
\Windows\system32\WINLOAD.EXE 
\Windows\system32\drivers\ksecdd.sys 
\Windows\system32\drivers\spldr.sys 
\Windows\system32\drivers\tpm.sys 
Assuming all images passed the code integrity check, then NTOSKRNL.EXE and all 
of its imports are now loaded. After this, OslHiveFindDrivers is used to locate all the boot 
drivers and sort them based on the Group (which is ordered according to 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\Control\GroupOrderList) and Tag (an 
integer which determines each driver’s order within its respective group). This sorted list of 
boot drivers is then passed to OslLoadDrivers for loading. OslLoadDrivers calls 
LoadImageEx for each driver in the list. LoadImageEx will load each driver and all of its 
dependencies. 
At this point, all the boot drivers are loaded. Next, OslpLoadNlsData is called to load 
native language locale information from 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\Control\NLS. Finally, the last step of 
OslpLoadAllModules is to call OslpLoadMiscModules which does the following: 
¾  Shows the progress bar seen during bootup 
¾  Loads %SystemRoot%\AppPatch\drvmain.sdb (the application compatibility database) 
¾  Loads %SystemRoot%\System32\acpitabl.dat 
¾  Loads an INF file pointed to by 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\CurrentControlSet\Control\Errata\InfName if present in the 
registry [4]. 
 
  Windows  Vistas  Kernel 
NTOSKRNL.EXE is responsible for the verification of system drivers (loaded after 
boot drivers) and drivers loaded at runtime (i.e., by the user or a device being inserted into the 
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system), in contrast, WINLOAD.EXE is responsible for checking the integrity of the 
signatures of boot drivers.. When integrity checks are enabled, the code integrity of the loaded 
image is checked SeValidateImageHeader (a wrapper to CiValidateImageHeader in CI.DLL) 
and SeValidateImageData (a wrapper to CiValidateImageData in CI.DLL). 
SeValidateImageHeader is called whenever an executable is mapped into kernel memory (via 
MmCreateSection). The code sections of kernel drivers are verified in SeValidateImageData 
which is called when a kernel module is being loaded. Runtime checks (e.g., continuously 
polling for modifications to the code sections of kernel drivers) are handled by PatchGuard 
and CI.DLL 
 
 
PatchGuard 
 
  Functions  of  PatchGuard 
  PatchGuard’s primary reason for existence is to prevent kernel-level rootkits. A rootkit 
is a set of software tools intended to conceal running processes, files or system data, thereby 
helping an intruder to gain and maintain access to a system while avoiding detection Rootkits 
often try to gain access to the kernel of the operating system. Kernel rootkits can be especially 
dangerous because they can be difficult to detect and are almost impossible to remove. 
  PatchGuard  does not prevent all rootkits or other malware from attacking the 
operating system. However, it does mitigate one uniquely destructive way to attack the 
system, namely patching kernel structures and code to manipulate kernel functionality. 
Protecting the integrity of the kernel is a fundamental step in protecting the entire system from 
malicious attacks and the reliability problems that may result from even well-intentioned 
patching [4]. 
PatchGuard is hidden within NTOSKRNL.EXE (obscured, but not encrypted) and 
checks the critical system structures at random intervals, usually around 5-10 minutes. When 
a modification is detected, the system will blue screen with the following bug check (which 
will obviously cause the user to lose all unsaved data): 
CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION (109) 
Bug check is generated when the kernel detects that critical 
kernel code or data have been corrupted. There are generally 
three causes for a corruption: 
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1) A driver has inadvertently or deliberately modified 
critical kernel code or data. See 
http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/driver/kernel/64bitPatching.mspx 
2) A developer attempted to set a normal kernel breakpoint 
using a kernel debugger that was not attached when the system 
was booted. Normal breakpoints, "bp", can only be set if the 
debugger is attached at boot time. Hardware breakpoints, "ba", 
can be set at any time. 
3) A hardware corruption occurred, e.g. failing RAM holding 
kernel code or data. 
Type of corrupted region, can be 
0 : A generic data region 
1 : Modification of a function or .pdata 
2 : A processor IDT 
3 : A processor GDT 
4 : Type 1 process list corruption 
5 : Type 2 process list corruption 
6 : Debug routine modification 
7 : Critical MSR modification 
PatchGuard cannot be disabled. Even when integrity checks are disabled, PatchGuard 
is still active [5]. 
 
PatchGuard Detection 
The two methods proposed to locate PatchGuard are: 
1. Walk the KiTimerListHead 
The background is that PatchGuard must register a timer event that will 
trigger the next scan (PatchGuard scans for changes in random intervals). These entries are 
represented using the KTIMER structure. The PatchGuard entry is easy to detect because all 
other entries will have a valid DeferredContext pointer in the KTIMER structure. 
The problem is that this list, pointed to by the KiTimerListHead variable is exported. We 
propose a reliable method to find the KiTimerListHead variable. After locating the 
KiTimerListHead variable, we traverse the linked list and locate all time entries that do not 
have a valid DeferredContext pointer. We cannot find the location of PatchGuard code in 
memory from the DeferredContext pointer because it is encoded (using unknown random 
numbers). Instead, we can remove the entries to disable PatchGuard. This is a partial 
implementation in C utilizing this technique: 
LIST_ENTRY *GetKiTimerListHead() 
{ 
KTIMER Timer; 
LARGE_INTEGER DueTime; 
KIRQL OldIrql; 
LIST_ENTRY *ListHead; 
KeInitializeTimer(&Timer); 
// If KeSetTimer returns TRUE, this is guaranteed to be index 0 
because 
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// we used the smallest possible time. 
// Likewise, we will be at the head of the list because there can't 
be anything smaller. 
// If KeSetTimer returns FALSE, then the timer already expired 
// So just use the smallest unit possible and we be at 
KiTimerListHead[0].Flink 
DueTime.QuadTime = -1; 
// Negative times are relative to current time--that's what we're 
interested in 
// If the timer object was already in the timer queue, 
// it is implicitly canceled before being set to the new expiration 
time. 
KeRaiseIrql(DISPATCH_LEVEL, &OldIrql); 
while (!KeSetTimer(&Timer, DueTime)) DueTime.QuadTime--; 
ListHead = Timer.TimerListEntry.Blink; 
KeCancelTimer(&Timer); 
KeLowerIrql(OldIrql); 
return ListHead; 
} 
void DisablePatchGuard() 
{ 
LIST_ENTRY *TimerTable = GetKiTimerListHead(); 
ASSERTMSG("Couldn't find KiTimerTableListHead", TimerTable); 
if (TimerTable) 
{ 
do 
{ 
ListHead = &TimerTable[Index]; 
NextEntry = ListHead->Flink; 
while (NextEntry != ListHead) 
{ 
Timer = CONTAINING_RECORD(NextEntry, KTIMER, 
TimerListEntry); 
NextEntry = NextEntry->Flink; 
ASSERT(Timer->Dpc && Timer->Dpc->DeferredRoutine); 
// Current DeferredRoutine will be either 
KiScanReadyQueues, 
// ExpTimeRefreshDpcRoutine, or ExpTimeZoneDpcRoutine 
if (IS_IN_NTOSKRNL(Timer->Dpc->DeferredRoutine) && 
!MmIsValidAddress(Timer->Dpc->DeferredContext)) 
{ 
RemoveEntryList(&Timer->TimerListEntry); 
return; 
} 
} 
Index += 1; 
} while(Index < MAX_INDEX); 
ASSERTMSG("Couldn't find PatchGuard timer", 0); 
} 
} 
 
2. Utilize a memory read breakpoint [7]. 
¾  Add a memory read breakpoint (using the Intel debug registers) on IDT entry 1. 
¾  Add an interrupt 3 (breakpoint exception) handler. PatchGuard will scan the IDT 
sequentially from the first entry to the last, so PatchGuard thread will trigger the 
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memory read breakpoint. A custom interrupt handler will be installed to handle 
breakpoint exceptions. 
¾  Wait for the memory read breakpoint exception to call the special interrupt handler 
we’ve installed. If the interrupt is not a memory read breakpoint on the first IDT entry, 
then this exception will be passed to the original interrupt 3 handler. Otherwise, the 
faulting instruction pointer is the PatchGuard thread and steps can be taken to disable 
PatchGuard (such as overwriting the PatchGuard code page with NOPs). This 
approach is likely to be effective at detecting PatchGuard since it detects a basic 
behavior of any integrity-checking memory scanning algorithm. 
 
 
Restricted User-Mode Access To \Device\Physical Memory 
 
Disabling user-mode access to \Device\PhysicalMemory is also a significant step in 
reducing the possibility of malicious code entering the kernel. It was first disabled in 
Windows 2003 SP1 and is still disabled in Windows Vista [6]. This can be done either by (1) 
scanning physical memory for a known signature of the area an attacker wishes to modify, or  
(2) calculating the physical address from a virtual address. One very convenient attack is to 
find the location of the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) and add a ring 0 call gate. Malicious 
code can then utilize the call gate using the CALL FAR instruction to jump into the kernel. 
Another technique is to find the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) and install an interrupt gate. 
Malicious code can then use the INT instruction to utilize it and jump into the kernel. The 
author previously created proof-of-concept tool that utilized \Device\PhysicalMemory to 
detect BIOS rootkits. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Windows Vista’s out-of-the-box kernel-mode security is a significant improvement 
over previous versions of Windows. It is likely that the security community will aggressively 
probe and seek to undermine Vista’s kernel security improvements. The Windows Vista 
kernel enhancements are aimed at preventing unsigned code from being injected into the 
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kernel and to establish a chain-of-trust from the time that Vista boots until applications are 
run.  
In this paper, we have identified some limits to the effectiveness of Windows Vista’s 
new kernel-mode security capabilities. The malicious driver could be hooked to 
NtQueryInformationFile and NtCreateFile (after disabling PatchGuard) to redirect attempts to 
load the NTOSKRNL.EXE or WINLOAD.EXE to the original, unmodified copy. This is to 
prevent any user-mode tools from detecting that the binaries have been patched. The only way 
to detect that the files have been patched would be to inspect them “on-disk” at a lower level. 
Because this research work started when Windows Vista was still in beta, some of the 
behaviors described have changed prior to Windows Vista’s public release. Therefore, it is 
advised the reader continues to follow up on Microsoft Vista blogs such as 
http://blogs.msdn.com/uac and http://blogs.msdn.com/ie.  
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